Chisholm and the Doctrine of Temporal Parts :: Science

Chisholm and the Doctrine of Temporal Parts In the appendix to Person and Object, Roderick Chisholm discusses the doctrine of temporal parts. Chisholm’s position is that the arguments commonly supplied in support of the doctrine are not successful. In this paper, I will consider Chisholm’s objections and then give my own responses in favor of the doctrine of temporal parts. The doctrine of temporal parts, commonly called four dimensionalism, is a metaphysical theory concerning how it is that objects persist through time. Four dimensionalism holds that objects are both spatially and temporally extended; as such, an object is considered to be demarcated by its dimensions in both the spatial and temporal realms. In terms of parthood, then, four dimensionalism considers an object to be jointly composed of both its spatial and temporal parts. Moreover, at any one point in time, it is only a spatiotemporal part of the entire four dimensional whole that is presenting itself to us. The four dimensionalist speaks of these parts, or stages (â€Å"time slices†) of the four dimensional object as constituting, over a period of time, the entire object[1]. Another way of putting this is to say that a four dimensional object is an aggregate of all of its spatial and temporal parts. Opposed to this view of the persistence of objects through time is three dimensionalism. Three dimensionalism appears to be more in line with our common everyday sense of how objects persist through time; one in which we believe in, as Chisholm puts it, â€Å"the concept of one and the same individual existing at different times† (143). In contrast to the four dimensionalist, then, the three dimensionalist maintains that objects persist by being â€Å"wholly present† at each point at which they exist. Ultimately, Chisholm uses his arguments against temporal parts in order to support his general theses concerning personal identity over time. However, it is not within the scope of this paper to explore the underlying reasons Chisholm might have had for arguing against the four dimensionalist: that topic is best left to a more extensive project on the subject of the persistence of objects through time. For now, we will just take a look at three criticisms that Chishol m proposes for the temporal parts theorist: (1) that the so-called spatial analogy is not accurate, (2) that the doctrine of temporal parts does not solve the Phillip drunk/ Phillip sober puzzle, and (3) that the doctrine is of no use in solving various other metaphysical puzzles. Chisholm and the Doctrine of Temporal Parts :: Science Chisholm and the Doctrine of Temporal Parts In the appendix to Person and Object, Roderick Chisholm discusses the doctrine of temporal parts. Chisholm’s position is that the arguments commonly supplied in support of the doctrine are not successful. In this paper, I will consider Chisholm’s objections and then give my own responses in favor of the doctrine of temporal parts. The doctrine of temporal parts, commonly called four dimensionalism, is a metaphysical theory concerning how it is that objects persist through time. Four dimensionalism holds that objects are both spatially and temporally extended; as such, an object is considered to be demarcated by its dimensions in both the spatial and temporal realms. In terms of parthood, then, four dimensionalism considers an object to be jointly composed of both its spatial and temporal parts. Moreover, at any one point in time, it is only a spatiotemporal part of the entire four dimensional whole that is presenting itself to us. The four dimensionalist speaks of these parts, or stages (â€Å"time slices†) of the four dimensional object as constituting, over a period of time, the entire object[1]. Another way of putting this is to say that a four dimensional object is an aggregate of all of its spatial and temporal parts. Opposed to this view of the persistence of objects through time is three dimensionalism. Three dimensionalism appears to be more in line with our common everyday sense of how objects persist through time; one in which we believe in, as Chisholm puts it, â€Å"the concept of one and the same individual existing at different times† (143). In contrast to the four dimensionalist, then, the three dimensionalist maintains that objects persist by being â€Å"wholly present† at each point at which they exist. Ultimately, Chisholm uses his arguments against temporal parts in order to support his general theses concerning personal identity over time. However, it is not within the scope of this paper to explore the underlying reasons Chisholm might have had for arguing against the four dimensionalist: that topic is best left to a more extensive project on the subject of the persistence of objects through time. For now, we will just take a look at three criticisms that Chishol m proposes for the temporal parts theorist: (1) that the so-called spatial analogy is not accurate, (2) that the doctrine of temporal parts does not solve the Phillip drunk/ Phillip sober puzzle, and (3) that the doctrine is of no use in solving various other metaphysical puzzles.